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BREACH BRIEF🟡 Medium ThreatIntel

Widespread “/proxy/” URL Scans Targeting Proxy Servers with Embedded IP Addresses

SANS ISC observed a spike in scans that probe for open proxy services using the “/proxy/” path and raw IP addresses. The activity signals potential abuse of mis‑configured forward proxies, a risk for any vendor exposing web‑gateway functionality.

LiveThreat™ Intelligence · 📅 March 17, 2026· 📰 isc.sans.edu
🟡
Severity
Medium
TI
Type
ThreatIntel
🎯
Confidence
High
🏢
Affected
2 sector(s)
✅
Actions
3 recommended
📰
Source
isc.sans.edu

Widespread “/proxy/” URL Scans Targeting Proxy Servers with Embedded IP Addresses

What Happened — Over the past weekend, SANS Internet Storm Center honeypots recorded a surge in scans that probe for open proxy services using the “/proxy/” path combined with raw IP addresses in the URL. Attackers attempt to manipulate the Host header or embed the target hostname to force the proxy to forward the request, a classic technique for abusing mis‑configured forward proxies.

Why It Matters for TPRM —

  • Open proxies can be leveraged to hide malicious traffic, exfiltrate data, or launch further attacks against your supply‑chain partners.
  • Third‑party services that expose proxy functionality (e.g., CDN edge nodes, cloud‑hosted web apps) may become inadvertent launch pads if not hardened.
  • Early detection of scanning trends helps you validate that your vendors enforce proper proxy hardening and logging.

Who Is Affected — Cloud‑hosted SaaS providers, CDN operators, MSPs offering web‑gateway services, and any organization that runs public‑facing web applications.

Recommended Actions —

  • Review contracts and security questionnaires for any third‑party that operates forward‑proxy or edge‑proxy services.
  • Verify that vendors enforce strict Host‑header validation and block generic “/proxy/” paths.
  • Ensure logging of proxy‑related requests and monitor for anomalous patterns.
  • Conduct periodic penetration testing focused on proxy mis‑configuration.

Technical Notes — Attackers use crafted HTTP requests with the “Host” header set to an internal IP or domain while requesting “/proxy/”. No specific CVE is cited; the activity is a reconnaissance scan rather than an exploit. Data types at risk include authentication cookies, session tokens, and any data that traverses the proxy. Source: SANS Internet Storm Center – /proxy/ URL scans with IP addresses (Mar 16)

📰 Original Source
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32800 ↗

This LiveThreat Intelligence Brief is an independent analysis. Read the original reporting at the link above.

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