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BREACH BRIEF🟠 High ThreatIntel

Fake Cloudflare Bot Checks Deliver LunexStealer Malware on Over 100 Compromised Websites

CERT‑UA uncovered a campaign that injects fake Cloudflare verification pages into more than 100 sites, prompting visitors to run a command that installs LunexStealer. The incident underscores the importance of continuous web‑application integrity monitoring and third‑party risk documentation for audit readiness.

LiveThreat™ Intelligence · 📅 October 08, 2026· 📰 securityaffairs.com
🟠
Severity
High
TI
Type
ThreatIntel
🎯
Confidence
High
🏢
Affected
2 sector(s)
✅
Actions
3 recommended
📰
Source
securityaffairs.com

Fake Cloudflare Bot Checks Used to Distribute LunexStealer Malware on Over 100 Compromised Websites

What Happened – In September 2026 CERT‑UA identified more than 100 web sites that had been injected with malicious JavaScript. The script displayed a counterfeit Cloudflare “I’m not a bot” page and prompted visitors to run a command. The command silently downloaded an MSI installer that deployed the LunexStealer malware family. The campaign is controlled via a smart‑contract on Polygon/Ethereum, allowing attackers to switch domains or toggle the attack without touching the compromised pages.

Why It Matters for Trust & Control Assurance

  • Demonstrates how a lack of continuous integrity monitoring lets attackers hide malicious code on production sites for months.
  • Highlights the need for auditable evidence that web‑application controls (code‑signing, script‑allow‑list, bot‑challenge integrity) are continuously enforced and verified.
  • Shows that third‑party risk (hosting providers, CDN configurations) must be documented and re‑validated to maintain a defensible audit trail.

Who Is Affected – Organizations that host public‑facing web applications or rely on third‑party CDNs (e.g., SaaS platforms, e‑commerce sites, media portals).

Recommended Actions

  • Deploy file‑integrity monitoring or runtime application self‑protection (RASP) to detect unauthorized script changes.
  • Enforce strict code‑signing and CSP (Content‑Security‑Policy) rules that block inline script execution from unknown origins.
  • Review and document third‑party CDN and hosting contracts; add continuous verification of their security controls to your audit evidence.

Technical Notes – The attack uses a “ClickFix” command‑execution technique, delivering an MSI that either (1) bypasses Windows UAC, (2) creates Defender exclusions and exploits CVE‑2023‑20598 via a vulnerable AMD driver (BYOVD), or (3) performs DLL side‑loading. The malicious page is served only twice per 12 hours per visitor to evade traffic‑anomaly detection. Source: https://securityaffairs.com/200537/hacking/cert-ua-fake-cloudflare-checks-deliver-lunexstealer-malware.html

📰 Original Source
https://securityaffairs.com/200537/hacking/cert-ua-fake-cloudflare-checks-deliver-lunexstealer-malware.html ↗

This LiveThreat Intelligence Brief is an independent analysis. Read the original reporting at the link above.

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